Connecting the dots: Pakistan's jihad policy, conflict-driven economy and hostage-taking

The Pakistan Army does not intend to end its jihad policies. Rather, it runs an international protection racket with jihadis as enforcers and only seeks international quiescence to continue.

Before 9/11,  under cover of international quiescence, Pakistan used overt violence by its military and jihadi proxies to pursue its aims in Afghanistan, Indian Kashmir and beyond.

After 9/11, Pakistan's overt use of  jihadi  proxies became untenable. Every year since, Pakistan watchers have speculated on whether Pakistan has finally given up on its militarism. Year upon year, when public officials and media in US, India and Afghanistan have made diplomatic overtures to Pakistan, they declared that Pakistan is indeed moving towards that culmination. [Indian mandarins quoted ; John Kerry;Doctrinal Shifts?;Ashraf Ghani needs Pakistan]

Pakistani authorities do occasionally make a show of bringing to book some of their jihadi clients. For instance, cases were filed against some of the Pakistani conspirators of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, but these cases have now either stalled or been dismissed altogether.

The Pakistan Army has also conducted a number of military operations to dismantle the FATA sanctuaries of jihadi organizations including the recent  Zarb-e-Azb campaign. But these campaigns, while creating millions of refugees and costing many soldiers' lives have not been decisive and fighters continue to regroup elsewhere in the region. [Zarb-e-Azb fallout; Pakistani Taliban missile test; US drones kill Taliban and Al Qaeda] 

There is also a strong element of theater in these piecemeal military campaigns against terrorists -   the Pakistan Army often negotiates agreements with Pakistani Taliban [Killed while negotiating;  Prisoner releases; Peace Talks] and at other times the Pakistan Army accuses foreign intelligence agencies of funding them. [Foreign intelligence] 

Yet, continuing violence in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and  Pakistan, and the good health of many jihadi organizations shows that Pakistan has not given up on militarism. Pakistan has taken no decisive steps, either to shut down its jihadi infrastructure in the form of organizations and training camps, or to end the continuing jihadi violence against civilians within and outside Pakistan nor yet reform jihadi ideological education provided to school children and jihadi recruits.

Hence, Pakistan's willingness to hold talks with India and Afghanistan or extend cooperation to the US  does not mean it has given up on the use of jihadi proxies.

Rather, it appears that Pakistan merely seeks an elite consensus with the elites in Afghanistan, India and the US  to advance its strategic, economic and ideological aims  while continuing the use of jihadi proxies as pressure tactic. [Pakistan's confidence] It seeks elite quiescence as cover to continue violence against ordinary citizens and soldiers of these countries.

For instance, Pakistan wants India to yield on Kashmir and other points of conflict, without closing down the jihadi group Jamat-ud-Dawa, nor prosecuting the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks nor stopping orchestrated jihadi attacks on Indian soldiers and civilians.[Najam Sethi at Clinton roundtable; Najam Sethi editorial]

Pakistan wants nuclear privileges, military and economic aid from US for cooperation in Afghanistan without withdrawing support for the Taliban and thereby undermining the US/NATO mission in Afghanistan. [Spring Offensive] 

Pakistan wants President Ghani to make concessions to it on Afghan governance, military matters and trade, all without any commitment to restrain Taliban from attacking Afghans on Afghan soil.  [Helmand Offensive] 

All this can summarized as the elites of Pakistan saying to elites of India, Afghanistan and the US 'Show some statesmanship  and become our hostages. Let us profit from improving ties with you while our jihadi proxies hold your citizens' lives hostage. What alternative do you have anyway'.

In other words, Pakistan is not pursuing peace either with India or Afghanistan nor behaving like an ally of the US. Rather, Pakistan is demanding concessions  alongside continuation of conflict for the purposes of demanding further concessions.

It is worth recalling what B.R. Ambedkar wrote in the 1940s about Muslim elite demands in the context of the Pakistan movement:

 "..there is a difference between appeasement and settlement, and that the difference is an essential one. Appeasement means buying off the aggressor by conniving at his acts of murder, rape, arson and loot against innocent persons who happen for the moment to be the victims of his displeasure. On the other hand, settlement means laying down the bounds which neither party to it can transgress. Appeasement sets no limits to the demands and aspirations of the aggressor. Settlement does. ".

In refusing to end its jihad militarism, Pakistan shows itself unwilling to accept bounds which it will not transgress in any agreement with India, Afghanistan or the US. Hence, buying it off will not end its aggression. It appears that the Pakistan Army is in the position of mafia dons and jihadi organizations are their enforcers. For past and recent ISI functionaries, this role of the Pakistan state, its Army and its jihadi proxies is officially imbued with ideological fervor. [Asad Ali Durrani speaking of DNA of Pakistanis on Al Jazeera ]

Such an international protection racket is similar to the domestic protection racket that is currently in place inside Pakistan between  common citizens, jihadi organizations, state organs, the Pakistan Army and some political parties. In lieu of a social contract as a basis for a stable society, it appears that least since the Afghan jihad, Pakistan has become sociologically predisposed to consider protection rackets as normal order of business.

As a corollary, Pakistan now has a quasi-conflict driven economy, with state entities like the Army dependent on conflict-linked cash and arms flows as well as large and growing shares of the national exchequer and land.  Development doesn't bring profits to the Army and jihadis, while conflict does. The uproar about the preconditions of the Kerry-Lugar Bill bear this out.  [Pakistans military riled by the Kerry-Lugar bill ; Editors' displeasure at Kerry-Lugar provisions]  

And for example, a number of ordinary citizens are held hostage in Pakistan. [Taseer annd Gilani; Foreign hostages] Those who don't pay up  are liable to get killed by jihadi proxies [French engineers] Sometimes paying doesn't help either. [Warren Weinstein]  Meanwhile the general public faces targeted mass killings in public places. [Shia killings; Terrorist incidents 2014 ;Terrorist incidents 2015]

A comprehensive strategy for realignment of national policy and better policing to protect vulnerable citizens from extortionists and kidnappers and also to end targeted killings by jihadi proxies of Shias, Christians, Ahmedis and other ordinary citizens are not priorities for the Pakistan ruling elite and its security forces.

Domestically, Pakistan's affected citizens have no leverage to effect a change. The conflict-linked economy is too profitable to the Army and jihadi organizations for either to change course.

On the international front, Pakistan's 'show statesmanship and become our hostages' exhortations to India are currently not working, even after it tried blackmail via breaking the longstanding ceasefire on the Line of Control and international border.

With respect to the US, in the short term the US continues to supply Pakistan with aid and arms. [US aid and arms] But in the medium term, Pakistan sees diminishing leverage as  the US pulls out of Afghanistan and gets out of its existing hostage situation with respect to Pakistan. To retain leverage and to slow the US troop withdrawal, Pakistan is now building a bogey of an ISIS threat.[Curious ISIS outrage about the Kerry-Lugar Bill ; Jalalabad ]

Meanwhile, given that Taliban continues to launch military offensives and attack civilians, Mr. Ghani is for now a permanent hostage of Pakistan, and has no options except to exhibit acquiescence to Pakistan and do a delicate balancing act between Afghanistan's security and Pakistan's pressure tactics. Since Pakistan takes no responsibility for ending Taliban violence, he is faced with civil war whether he makes nice with Pakistani whims or not. The best he can buy is time.

Prognosis for the future

Currently the Pakistan Army and other decision makers are protecting their jihadi proxies from accountability by blaming India for all violence in the region. [Pakistan Army accuses RAW; RAW 2]

This signals that Pakistan's international and domestic protection racket using violence will continue for now. Broad-based ideological and socioeconomic change in Pakistan is required before Pakistan's Army and other decision makers change their mindset and stop trying to trade on conflict and violence in international relations.

One such opportunity for change is China's recent decision to invest $46 billion in infrastructure projects in Pakistan. [Chinese investment] This economic initiative  will likely hit obstacles since like the Kerry-Lugar provisions, it will constitute an aberration in Pakistan's conflict-driven economy. The success of these development projects will not earn the Army either cash or arms, and simultaneously their jihadi proxies would also not get paid off.

In the pattern of its hostage-taking attempts with the US, Afghanistan and India, Pakistan may in future heat up the jihadi insurgency in Xinjiang, and thereby hold the Chinese development projects in Pakistan hostage for payoffs to its conflict economy. If China becomes too strong a rival to US interests, Pakistan might even wage jihad again in association with the US.