Munis Faruqui has written a book on Aurangzeb “Aurangzeb ‘Alamgir and the Mughal Empire: A History Retold”. He has based the book on surviving documents available from Aurangzeb’s time, largely those called the akhbarat, the regular and voluminous communications that the Mughal emperor maintained with his correspondents in different parts of his vast realm.
It is a very informative book and I would recommend it despite the fact that the author chooses to rationalize or even deny Aurangzeb’s many documented iconoclastic actions.
Mr. Faruqui has written a very detailed narration of a regime in the mid 17th century to early 18th century (Aurangzeb lived 1618-1707) and yet I often felt I am reading about modern day Pakistan. There appear to be so many commonalities between a pre-modern Muslim emperor’s theory of state and the modern Pakistani theory of state, particularly under military rule.
Pakistan may actually aspire to be a successor state to the Mughal Empire. Ayaz Amir, columnist in Dawn, wrote in 2004 What, if anything, was Partition about?
In a crucial sense, then, the Pakistan movement signalled a retreat from the heartland of empire to its outer edges, the final evacuation from Delhi and Agra to new centres of power in Punjab and Bengal. But even then it was for the new state, Pakistan, to create a historical justification for itself by emulating and rivalling, in achievement and glory, even if on a reduced scale, the success of its historical model, the Mughal Empire (in a 20th Century setting, it goes without saying)
…
The principal strengths of Muslim rule in the subcontinent were war, the consolidation of conquest, politics and administration. In all these fields Pakistan has not distinguished itself.
Whether Pakistan succeeds in attaining ‘achievement and glory’, as a Mughal successor state very much depends on how Pakistan defines those terms.
Despite Ayaz Amir style handwaving, it is difficult to quantify what precisely it is about the Mughal state that Pakistan wants to emulate. This blog aims to point out some curious, and perhaps unintended or intended commonalities.
However, before doing that, one big difference between Mughal rule and present day Pakistan must be mentioned.
The Mughal Empire in its early and peak periods ( Babur to Aurangzeb, 1526 - 1707 with a 5 year interruption 1540-1545 by Sheh Shah Suri) had a ruling class which was very opulent and extremely rich. Aurangzeb was said to be the richest man in the world in his time.
This was in contrast to the struggling peasant and artisan class, though the Mughal imposition of peace on conquered regions often encouraged growth of commerce. In certain other cases, rich merchants ( such as in Surat) were looted and murdered by the emperor, which forced their collective move to European enclaves.
Pakistan, too, has an eye-poppingly rich ruling class alongside a struggling general population.
However, in contrast to Pakistan, the Mughal potentates’ sources of wealth were entirely internal.
Apart from seizing treasuries, precious jewelry/gems and cash hoards of conquered kings and territories, the Mughals derived their riches from internal revenue, by extracting agricultural revenue (30-35% of the crop on average, 14%-50% depending on circumstances) and also, by taxing goods production and internal trade.
In contrast, Pakistan has a perpetual fiscal deficit between government revenues and expenditure. It has a very narrow direct taxpayer base of salaried employees, for example and 80% of government revenues ( from direct taxes, sales taxes, excise taxes, petroleum sales) go into debt servicing and defence.
Leaving aside the informal or off the books economy and significant foreign remittances from overseas workers, Pakistan’s economy sustains itself with a succession of foreign loans.
At their peak, the Mughals had fiscal surpluses to play with, and would send huge amounts of money as gifts to the Saudi Arabian peninsula (Mecca, Medina), Safavid Persia, Uzbeks and the Ottomans.
In contrast, Pakistan receives grants and loans from multilateral institutions, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf nations.
In summary, as to finances, Pakistan and the Mughals do not resemble each other. What ways that they do resemble each other are listed below.
1. Autocratic leaders
Aurangzeb was a highly autocratic head of state. It would be so in any 17th century kingdom or empire.
Pakistan too has autocratic leaders, which is incongruous in the 21st century. Pakistanis are not Mughal subjects. They are equal citizens and the imposition of autocracy or restrictions on their political, economic and cultural choices, as is being done, cannot be justified by any principle of modern citizenship.
2. Military embedded in basic structure of the state
Aurangzeb like his Mughal predecessors had a trusted band of militarily capable mansabdars or military chiefs. They were granted territory or other revenue sources by the emperor to maintain themselves, their underlings and their soldiers.
Additionally, the emperor appointed governors of provinces who held similar or larger powers. The goal was to keep strong military and economic control over conquered territory, to subdue rebellions, to extract revenue from the land and subjects( farmers, tradesmen, tolls, trading posts).
The revenue collectors would use the revenue to pay the emperor’s share, to sustain their households and maintain their military contingents. They would also undertake military attacks on neighboring territories for the continuous expansion of the empire.
Pakistan’s military rewards its top brass with land grants. It is also engaged in fighting political dissidents in all its provinces.
Since independence in 1947, repeatedly, peaceful political movements including regular political parties that rival the military’s power have been suppressed as rebels by arrests, imprisonment or legal restrictions, including exile. The civil administrative service and civilian police are often made subservient to military priorities.
The Mughal emperor had his loyalists who carried out targeted violence on his foes at his command. Pakistan’s military has multiple secret services which abduct, coerce or assassinate those they designate as enemies. It also trains and funds its own religious militias to attack designated enemies or to carry out its political agendas.
Pakistan’s military takes up a lion’s share of the state’s revenues available after debt servicing. Additionally, it owns vast lands and lucrative commercial enterprises including goods manufacturing and real estate development. The military in Pakistan is particularly active in continuing acquisition of land and in occupying high positions in state enterprises at the cost of civilians.
In other words, the tenor of the Pakistan military’s engagement in matters in the civilian sphere is for purposes of regime protection, political subjugation and for revenue extraction. A very Mughal attitude.
3. Subject status of Mughal subjects vs citizens of Pakistan
Mughal subjects who paid revenue in the Mughal Empire had standing only as sources of revenue. The mansabdars, jagirdars ( people granted power to levy revenue), governors and the emperor cared very much about efficient revenue extraction.
Mughal administrators would draw up detailed evaluations of how much revenue various territories and regions could yield and would hold revenue extractors accountable if the amounts fell short. In turn, pressure was applied on subjects to pay up.
However, there were cases of entire villages of people who would relocate to a different kingdom when Mughal revenue extraction got unsustainable. Depopulation of farm lands caused loss of revenue to the Mughal empire and to that end, Mughal administrators sometimes made efforts to avoid peasant distress and to reverse such depopulation.
Even so there are reports from contemporary observers that the extent of revenue extraction by the Mughal administration caused people to sell their children, starve to death or themselves be forced to be sold as slaves to make up the shortfalls.
In summary, the Mughal empire valued the Mughal subject as a revenue source or taxable producer of goods with no other intrinsic standing.
In 21st century Pakistan, it appears citizens have no intrinsic standing with respect to their needs or wants, even as revenue sources. They are just pre-existing elements of the state.
One will rarely hear Pakistan’s autocratic leaders, civilian or military discuss substantively at length ( other than paying lip service), the need to grow the Pakistan economy, create jobs, increase trade, create environments for foreign investments, boost manufacturing, improve education/population up-skilling, or develop science and technology.
Approximately, 40% of Pakistan’s elementary age children are out of school. No military or civilian leader will mention this. In 2002-2007, Pervez Musharraf turned funding needs for Pakistan’s school education into a much ballyhooed international cause only for purposes of grifting American money.
Any human or economic development in Pakistan happens outside the peripheral vision of the autocratic leader and the all powerful military. The main focus of the military and ruling elite is on maximizing their own standing /extractive/ rentier power in domestic and international affairs.
As elections are rigged, there is no existing mechanism to force the military or the political elite to view the Pakistan citizen in any different light than as a Mughal subject.
4. Harsh treatment of rival power centers
The Mughal emperor Aurangzeb was very harsh towards his rival sources of power, whether his own siblings, religious leaders/institutions, militarily successful but insufficiently loyal subordinates, or rebellious vassal states.
The emperor acted pragmatically when he could to co-opt his challengers and make them submit to his authority. But otherwise, the emperor would get people threatening his authority to be brutally killed, tortured or imprisoned.
Such were the constraints of maintaining kingship anywhere in the 17th century. Kill or be killed. Exhibit brutality.
Meanwhile while claiming to be a Republic, Pakistani leaders used these tactics in the 20th and 21st century. Prime Ministers whether elected or otherwise have been hanged, assassinated, jailed and exiled almost without exception. Journalists and political dissidents have fled to other countries under threat of being killed.
To disagree on any aspect of public affairs with the reigning military autocrat or his co-opted allied ruling elites is to invite violent retribution.
This is a supposedly free country with no effective political rights to advocate or freely associate or aspire to gain office without first accepting subjugation to its unaccountable ruling elites.
Very Mughal political situation.
5. Mantle of Islam
Aurangzeb and his Mughal predecessors used the mantle of Islam to grant themselves legitimacy in their rule. Some of Aurangzeb’s siblings associated themselves with Sufi religious figures (pirs). And, for example, his sister Jahanara was buried by her own wish next to her Sufi spiritual master.
Aurangzeb styled himself as a zinda pir or living religious mystic. His aura of religious mysticism greatly enhanced his influence in his time and ever since.
His authority or his actions cannot be questioned even in the present day without offending religious sensibilities of modern day adherents to his religious authority. These include admirers of his actions to advance the cause of Islam, which include iconoclasm and subjugation of Hindu and other religious figures.
Pakistan’s leaders often associate themselves with religious figures. Many members of the ruling elite are living pirs themselves. Imran Khan married a woman Sufi pirni as a necessary mystical step to attain Prime Ministership. There is an aura of religion that is constantly invoked in discussions of Pakistan’s affairs.
Now take the Pakistan Army and its frequent invocation of its authority under Islam and its appropriation of Allah’s will. Just recently, the ISPR spokesman invoked the Quran’s verses to fault the Afghan Taliban for seeking cooperation with the “infidels” of India.
Without such invocations of Islam and Allah, the Pakistan Army would be nothing more than a Latin American military which would be thrown out of power after many years of dictatorial misrule. This has been attempted multiple times in Pakistan but the military always manages to regain not just supremacy but its legitimacy as overlord.
Citing its authority as defender of the Islamic faithful grants the Pakistan Army unlimited years of unlimited power over the living and an unlimited license to kill millions of its own and other countries’ (Afghanistan, India) citizens on any pretext.
Conclusion
In summary, the Pakistani state is run like a Mughal imperial state by its military and allied ruling elite.
Other than making nice with the military, falling out of favor and fleeing or spending their lives in prison (these were exactly Mughal dissenters’ choices), there is no other out for Pakistani citizens from autocracy either on moral/ religious basis or even apparently, on basis of their constitution. They are as trapped in their fates as Mughal subjects were.
The theory of the Pakistan state is morphing into the theory of the Mughal state. Ayaz Amir may consider his glass half full.
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